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* I am grateful to Stefan Zink for helpful comments. 1 Introduction
Many theoretical and empirical contributions emphasize the importance of human
capital externalities for growth patterns and underdevelopment traps. In a seminal
paper, Acemoglu (1996) provides a microeconomic foundation for such externali-
ties which are not “technological” as in the early growth models of Lucas (1988)
or Azariadis and Drazen (1990) but “pecuniary” in the sense that human capital
investment aﬀects factor prices in a growth–enhancing way. More investment in
human capital triggers a surge in physical capital investment which, through labor
search frictions, beneﬁts all workers and raises the skill premium. A similar external-
ity exists with respect to physical capital, but if the labor market is frictionless, all
these pecuniary externalities disappear. Moreover, Acemoglu’s argument strongly
rests on technological complementarity between capital and labor.
This paper develops a diﬀerent channel where pecuniary externalities emerge when
the labor market is characterized by another departure from the Walrasian bench-
mark: monopsonistic competition between employers. To this end, I augment the
model of Bhaskar and To (1999) by an education choice of workers prior to ﬁrms’
investment. A pecuniary human capital externality emerges whose mechanism is
quite diﬀerent from Acemoglu’s model. When more workers invest in skills, more
ﬁrms invest in skill–intensive technology. This makes wage competition between
these ﬁrms more intense, driving skilled wages up, further stimulating incentives to
invest in education. As in Acemoglu (2003), an increase in educational attainment
raises the skill premium through investment in skill–biased technology. However,
the argument does not rely on technological complementarity between capital and
labor, and productivity of skilled workers does not increase with more investment;
instead the skilled wage increases because of intensiﬁed competition.
Another result of this paper is equilibrium multiplicity: the strategic complementar-
ity between investment decisions implies that an equilibrium with positive invest-
ment always co–exists with a (stable) no–investment equilibrium. Thus, underde-
velopment traps can occur as a result of coordination failure.
12 The model
Consider a regional labor market which is a circle of unit length in the spirit of
Salop (1979) and Bhaskar and To (1999). The region is populated by a uniformly
distributed group of workers of mass M, each supplying one unit of indivisible
labor. Workers can either work in a competitive low–skill labor market at wage
b, or they can obtain education and work in one of ﬁnitely many, symmetrically
located “technology ﬁrms” employing skilled labor. Education is a 0–1 decision
and workers must incur a positive (eﬀort) cost to obtain it. Education costs are
uniformly distributed on [0,CM] and are uncorrelated with location. That is, at
any circle segment of length ε, mass mε of workers has education cost of Cm or
smaller, for any m ∈ [0,M].
All educated workers are equally productive at all technology ﬁrms and output per
worker is denoted A. An educated worker living distance x from his employer pays
commuting costs tx in order to travel to work.1 Workers aim to maximize their
income net of the costs of commuting and education. Firms maximize proﬁt net
of entry (or capital) costs which are F > 0 for all technology ﬁrms. The strategic
interaction between ﬁrms and workers is modeled by the following three–stage game.
Stage I: Workers decide whether to obtain education or not.
Stage II: Technology ﬁrms enter the labor market and locate symmetrically.
Stage III: Entrant ﬁrms i = 1,...,n simultaneously announce high–skill wages
wi. Skilled workers decide to work at the ﬁrm where wage income net of
commuting costs are largest.
The timing assumption that workers obtain education before technology ﬁrms enter
reﬂects the idea that an irreversible education choice has a longer time horizon than
an irreversible capital investment. It is also assumed that workers at stage I cannot
1There is also a non–geographic interpretation of this model where “locations” reﬂect non–wage
job characteristics and workers’ preferences over these horizontally diﬀerentiated characteristics.
2foresee ﬁrms’ locations at stage II (although they correctly anticipate how many
ﬁrms enter the labor market). This seems reasonable given that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent
between all symmetric locations.2 Throughout the following analysis, A is large
relative to t and b so that all educated workers decide to work for a technology ﬁrm
rather than working at the low–skill wage b.3 It is also assumed that M is so large
that not all workers obtain education.
3 Equilibrium and multiplicity
I solve the model by backward induction. When E < M workers obtain education
and n technology ﬁrms enter the market, labor supply to any ﬁrm i oﬀering wi when








provided that |wi−w| ≤ t/n. Firm i maximizes (A−wi)L(wi,w) which leads to the
best response wi = (A − t/n + w)/2 and thus to the symmetric Nash equilibrium
where wi = w = w∗ = A−t/n and where proﬁt of each technology ﬁrm is π = Et/n2.
At stage II, the number of entrants n is the solution to the free–entry condition
Et
n
2 = F . (1)
In the following, I deliberately ignore integer problems and I also ignore the monop-
sony case n = 1. At the ﬁrst stage, a worker with education cost Cm obtains
education if the expected high–skill income net of expected commuting costs and
2An alternative assumption giving rise to the same result is that workers are randomly relocated
on the circle after obtaining education.
3The assumption of a competitive low–skill labor market simpliﬁes the analysis, but similar
results (i.e. equilibrium multiplicity and human capital externalities) can also be obtained when
there is monopsonistic competition between an endogenous number of low–technology ﬁrms.





tx dx − Cm = A − 5t
4n − Cm .
It follows that mass E of workers obtain education where
CE ≥ A − b − 5t
4n , E ≥ 0 , (2)
with complementary slackness. Figure 1 illustrates the free–entry (capital invest-
ment) condition (1) and the education condition (2). It is clear that there are
generically either the three equilibria as shown by the intersections of these curves,
or only one equilibrium with E = n = 0. If education and entry costs are not too
large, there are three equilibria, one is the no–investment equilibrium at E = n = 0,
and there are two others with positive investment. Of these two, only the one with
more education and entry at (n∗,E∗) is “stable” in the natural adjustment dynamics
(where after a small deviation E0  = E∗ workers anticipate that n0 ﬁrms enter which
would trigger E1 educated workers, n1 ﬁrms, E2 educated workers and so on, with
Et → E∗). The no–investment equilibrium is also stable in the sense that an edu-
cation investment by a small group of workers is followed by no entry of technology
ﬁrms since not even a monopsonist would be willing to incur the positive ﬁxed cost
to employ these workers.
4 Ineﬃciency
The social planner maximizes total output net of the costs of commuting, education




A − tx dx + (M − E)b −
Z E
0
Cm dm − Fn
= Mb + E
h





2 − nF .
4As explained above, each worker anticipates that n ﬁrms enter but he does not know the
distance x ∈ [0,1/(2n)] to the nearest of these ﬁrms which is uniformly distributed with density
2n dx.
4Figure 1: Equilibrium conditions (bold) and optimality conditions (dashed).
The planner’s objective function is not globally concave. An interior local maximum
satisﬁes the ﬁrst–order conditions
Et
4n
2 = F , (3)
CE = A − b − t
4n . (4)
As shown in Figure 1, these two conditions intersect twice, but only the larger
intersection is the maximum (the other is a saddle point of the objective function).
Denote the social optimum by (nS,ES). The optimal–entry condition (3) is left of
the free–entry condition (1): conditional on E, there is too much entry in this model
which is due to the well–known business–stealing eﬀect in the Salop (1979) model.
On the other hand, the optimal–education condition (4) is above the education–
choice condition (2). Conditional on n, too few workers decide to obtain education.
This is because workers do not internalize the positive externality of their education
decision on technology ﬁrms’ proﬁts. The results that workers invest too little and
5that ﬁrms invest too much5 are not only true conditional on investment on the other
market side, but even unconditional:
Proposition 1 In an equilibrium with positive investment, education is too low and
entry of technology ﬁrms is excessive, i.e. E∗ < ES and n∗ > nS.
Proof: Substitution of (3) into (4) shows that ES satisﬁes





On the other hand, substitution of (1) into (2) implies that E∗ solves





Because the right–hand side in (6) is smaller than in (5) and because ES and E∗
are the larger of the two positive roots of (5) and (6), it follows that E∗ < ES.
To prove the second claim, substitution of (4) into (3) and of (2) into (1) show that
nS solves
G
S(n) = A − b − t
4n − CF4n
2
t = 0 ,
and that n∗ solves
G
∗(n) = A − b − 5t
4n − CFn
2
t = 0 .
Both GS and G∗ are hump–shaped functions which converge to −∞ when n → 0
or n → ∞. Moreover GS(n) < G∗(n) iﬀ n > n0 = [t2/(3CF)]1/3 and G∗ has a local
maximum at n1 = [5t2/(8CF)]1/3. On the other hand, G∗(n1) ≥ 0 is necessary for
an equilibrium with positive investment, and then n1 ≤ n∗ because n∗ is the larger
of the two positive solutions of G∗(n) = 0. Because of n1 > n0, it follows that
n∗ ≥ n1 > n0 and therefore GS(n∗) < G∗(n∗) = 0 which implies that nS < n∗. 2
5 Human capital externalities
In the light of Proposition 1, it is obvious that an appropriate combination of an
education subsidy with a proﬁt tax (accompanied by a lump–sum tax/transfer)
5In a related model, Kaas and Madden (2008) show that ﬁrms invest too little at the intensive
margin due to a holdup–type argument.
6can implement the ﬁrst–best solution. What is more, welfare can be raised by an
education subsidy alone, although the consequence is that even more than n∗ > nS
technology ﬁrms enter the market. To see this, solve the free–entry condition (1)
for n(E) and substitute it into the welfare function to obtain
W(n(E),E) = Mb + E
h









This term is increasing at E = E∗. The intuition is as follows: with more human–
capital investment more ﬁrms enter the market, but since ﬁrms make zero proﬁts,
the net eﬀect on ﬁrms’ surplus is nil. The worker surplus must go up, however, since
the loss of an increase in E from E∗ is second–order whilst the gain from an increase
in n is ﬁrst–order: the skilled wage goes up due to ﬁercer wage competition between
technology ﬁrms.
This model, as Acemoglu (1996), exhibits a pecuniary externality of human capital
investment. When more workers invest in human capital, the skilled wage increases
because more technology ﬁrms enter who compete more intensively for skilled work-
ers. Obviously, since the low–skill wage is ﬁxed at b, the skill premium also increases
in response to an expansion of educational attainment. In that respect, the model
also exhibits similarities with Acemoglu (2003) who argues that the skill premium
increases in response to an increase in the supply of skills because skill–biased tech-
nical change raises the relative wage of skilled labor. In this paper, it is not more
productive technology that raises wages but it is more intense competition between
technology ﬁrms. In fact, if the labor market was perfectly competitive, the skill
premium would be ﬂat at A − b, and also the pecuniary externality disappears. To
sum up:
Proposition 2 An increase of education (induced, for example, by an education
subsidy) raises the skilled wage and the skill premium. Welfare also increases in E
if E > E∗ is not too large.
76 Conclusion
This paper has identiﬁed another mechanism by which social increasing returns to
human capital arise due to a pecuniary externality. As in Acemoglu’s (1996) model,
more education triggers more investment in technology. In contrast to his model,
however, productivity of skilled workers does not go up. Instead the wage increase
is the result of ﬁercer competition between technology ﬁrms.
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